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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE IN FULL 1995

OCT 9 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Subject: 1962 Net Evaluation

1. The President has approved the following assumption as the basis for the annual Net Evaluation to be prepared in accordance with the provisions of NSC 5816:

NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED

"A nuclear attack in mid-1965 by the USSR against the United States, following the outbreak of limited war in Southeast Asia, with United States forces in a high state of alert, but with the Soviets seeking to achieve optimum surprise."

2. The following additional assumptions are proposed for the guidance of the staff in the preparation of the 1962 Net Evaluation. Certain operational assumptions will, of course, have to be developed by the staff as the problem progresses.

a. US forces are actively engaged in the limited war in Southeast Asia.

b. The US will receive only that tactical warning of a nuclear attack against the US which is within the capabilities of warning systems to be operational in mid-1965.

c. The USSR will be generally well-informed regarding US and Allied forces and warning and control nets.

d. US military posture will be as reflected in projected programs and planning documents.

e. The command-control system including the national decision-making process will be as expected to be available by mid-1965.

Copy 1 of 3

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
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f. Soviet military forces and weapons systems will be based on the applicable NIE's.

g. Capability for clandestine attack on the US will be as developed by the IIC and ICIS.

3. Your concurrence or comment on the additional assumptions contained in paragraph 2 above, is requested by 31 October 1961.

  
L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE**

**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR  
Room 2E 845, The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.**

**MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

**Subject: Additional Assumptions for the NESC 1962 Study**

1. Pursuant to your instructions, I discussed with Messrs. Amory, [ ] the Additional Assumptions as proposed by the NESC Staff. They are in agreement that acceptance of these assumptions will not pose problems from the intelligence point of view and that therefore you should indicate your concurrence to General Lemnitzer.

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2. With regard to assumption "f", current NIE's contain all force level figures and weapon system characteristics which will be required for developing an assumed Soviet force posture for the 1962 study, with the exception of the number of ICBM's on launchers and the deployment of an antimissile system (ABM).

3. With respect to the Soviet ICBM force, it is proposed that the figure for 1965 should be 450. The basis for this figure is given in Note 1 (attached). Note 2 gives comparative figures for the US ICBM force in that year.

4. With respect to the deployment of the Soviet ABM system, it is proposed the study assume that in 1965 Moscow and Leningrad would be so protected. The basis for this is given in Note 3.

5. I have discussed the above proposed ICBM and ABM assumptions with Messrs Amory, [ ] and they concur in recommending that you approve these assumptions.

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## NOTE 1

BASIS FOR ASSUMPTION PERTAINING TO  
SOVIET ICBM'S ON LAUNCHERS IN 1965

<u>Source</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>
NIE 11/8-1	10-25		75-125		
NIE 11/8-1 Projected (on basis of build up rates given therein - 100 and 150)				175-275	275-425
Army (unofficial)					200-400
Navy (unofficial)					400
Air Force (unofficial)	50	100	250	450	550
First generation	50	75	50		
Second generation		25	200	425	500
Third generation (30,000 lb wh)				25	50
NESC 1962 <sup>1/</sup> (proposed)	35	75	175	300	450
First generation	35	50	50	50	50
Second generation		25	125	250	400

1/ This assumed build-up of Soviet ICBM's on launchers is based on a median line between the Air Force figure and the mid-point of the NIE 11/8-1 range.

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NOTE 2

1. The figures below are the USICBM force which the Secretary of Defense is now considering:

Atlas D	-	30
Atlas E	-	28
Atlas F	-	74
Titan I	-	54
Titan II	-	54
Minuteman (H&D)	-	700
Minuteman (Train Mobile)	-	<u>50</u>

990

2. The Joint Chiefs are proposing that the total should be 1258. This would be based on an addition of 18 Titan II's, 200 Minuteman (H&D), and 50 Minuteman (Train mobile).

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Executive Registry

62-9355

20 December 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary  
National Security Council

SUBJECT : Security of Voice Communications Circuitry Between  
The White House and Nassau

1. In response to your inquiry this morning, we understand that the White House Communications Agency has leased five voice circuits between the White House and Nassau, Bahamas. The circuitry is divided into two main legs consisting of land lines leased from AT&T between the White House and Florida City, Florida, and a Tropospheric Scatter link (Radio) from Florida City, Florida to Nassau which is jointly operated by AT&T and a British Company. Backing up this circuitry is one high frequency single side band voice channel operated from the White House directly to Nassau. The White House Communications Agency has in place in Nassau a KY-9 which was to be connected directly via the leased circuitry to the White House. We have been informed by the White House Communications Agency that the KY-9 is not in operation, however, either because of equipment malfunction or instability with circuitry at Nassau, and as a consequence phone conversations are being handled in the clear.

2. The technical judgment is that without the use of the KY-9, conversations on the circuitry are susceptible to interception. The Tropospheric Scatter circuit may be intercepted by stationing intercept equipment in the path of the circuitry at either end, and landline circuits are certainly vulnerable to tapping and monitoring. In final analysis the circuitry being used is to some degree more secure than high frequency circuitry would be, but this is only a question of degree.

HENNINGTON D. SHELDON  
Assistant Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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